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The Department of the Army has expressed a need for the determina-
tion of the operational hit probabilities of several weapons systems in
use throughout the Army. These hit probabilities, together with lethal-
ity models, should yield predictions of the effects such systems will
have under various conditions of combat.
In this thesis, operational hit probability (OHP) is defined as the
probability that the center of impact of a volley of artillery fire will
fall within a specified distance of the center of an area target. A
general experimental methodology, which could be used to estimate OHP's
(under simulated combat conditions) for a field artillery weapons system,
is presented. More specifically, an approximate Chi-square distribution
of squared radial miss distance is suggested for estimating OHP's. A
method of using accuracy data from Army Training Tests to estimate
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Since the effectiveness of a weapons system* may ultimately be
determined by engaging the enemy, it is desirable to obtain quantita-
tive data regarding measures of effectiveness from actual combat
situations, where possible. Unfortunately, for various reasons, it is
usually not possible to obtain operational (combat) data. It is common,
therefore, to resort to field experimentation, wherein the pertinent
variables are observed under simulated combat conditions. The vari-
ables observed in a field experiment can then be used to estimate
operational parameters. These estimates may be useful in applications
to actual combat situations, provided the experiment is carefully de-
signed and conducted.
The accuracy requirements of any weapons system depend upon the
mission(s) to be performed by the system. For a Field Artillery Cannon
Weapons System (hereafter referred to as a "FA Weapon System") , the
mission may be the complete destruction of a point target,* the neutral-
ization or partial destruction of an area target,* or simply the
2harassment or interdiction of a target for a given period of time.
The destruction mission is performed by a single gun, with an observer
*A11 terms with asterisks are defined in Appendix A.
George E. Kimball and Philip M. Morse, Methods of Operations
Research (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951), p. 129.
2
FM 6-40. Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery (Washington: Department
of the Army, October, 1967), p. 27-2.
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initiating the adjustment and continuing until the target destruction
has been completed. The harassment mission does not require a high
degree of accuracy; indeed, it is usually fired at "map-spotted"
coordinates. Although the interdiction mission requires a greater
degree of accuracy than the harassment mission, interdiction fire is
usually of low intensity when compared to neutralization fire. In
more than half of the artillery missions of World War II (for which
data are available) , multiple guns were employed to neutralize area
targets. We shall consider only neutralization missions in this
paper, and we shall use the artillery battery, under battalion control,
as the basic firing element.
The purpose of this thesis is to propose an experimental method-
ology for determing the operational hit probabilities of a FA Weapons
System and to investigate other factors pertinent to the operation of
such a system. We define operational hit probability (OHP) as the
probability that the center of impact (CI) of a volley* of artillery
fire will fall within a specified distance of an aiming point (usually
the center of an area target ) . Defined as such, OHP is one of many
possible measures of effectiveness for a FA Weapons System. It has
not yet been determined whether OHP is a "good" measure of effective-
ness or whether it can be accurately estimated at a "reasonable" cost.
Such determinations should be made prior to conducting extensive
experiments with FA Weapons Systems.
J. D. Love, et al., Artillery Usage in World War II (U) , Volume II
(ORO-T-375, April, 1959), p. 133.
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The information gained by conducting experiments to measure the
OHP's of various FA Weapons Systems could be useful in many ways.
OHP's could be combined with conditional lethality models to produce
unconditional lethality models. Such information would increase the
effectiveness of FA units, since artillery commanders would be better
able to select the most appropriate weapons system for attacking a
particular type of target. More effective employment of FA units and
better fire planning should result. Additionally, OHP's should be
valuable in force planning; for example, in determining the optimal
mix of future FA Weapons Systems and in determining trade-offs between
FA Weapons Systems and other weapons systems. OHP's could be used for
both current and future logistics planning. They could also provide
military war gamers with realistic artillery parameter values for
future war games
.
A Tabular Firing Table is published by Department of the Army for
each FA Weapons System. Contained in these tables are corrections for
non-standard firing conditions,* as well as values of probable errors*
in range, deflection, and height of burst. These probable error
values are a measure of round-to-round dispersion, since they are
caused primarily by manufacturers' tolerances in ammunition and the
weapon itself. As such, the probable errors in the Tabular Firing
Table are inherent errors . * They have applications primarily when the
weapons are fired at point targets; that is, in destruction missions.
Since we have restricted our discussion to multiple weapons firing
neutralization missions at area targets, the tabled probable errors
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are of little value to us. We must concern ourselves with systems
errors,* which are attributable both to inherent errors and to other
factors such as variations in environment, wear in the weapon system,
and human errors.
During the past 25 years, several attempts have been made to
explain the system errors of certain FA Weapons Systems. Examples of
such attempts are:
1) an accuracy study of various artillery weapons systems, based
on single guns firing at point targets during the Korean conflict,
2) a study to determine the manner in which human errors contri-
2bute to the total errors in predicted artillery fire, and
3) a British pamphlet which discusses three earlier studies on
3
the accuracy of unobserved fire in combat.
These and other attempts are apparently unsatisfactory for determining
an acceptable measure of effectiveness for various reasons. For
example, some of these studies deal only with the attack of point tar-
gets, while others are based on data resulting from conditions which
only remotely resemble true combat conditions.
There is little doubt that the failure of these earlier reports
to provide a good measure of effectiveness for FA Weapons Systems had
Thornton Page, et al., On the Accuracy of Unobserved Artillery
Fire (ORO-T-271, April, 1954).
2
Jesse Orlansky, et al
.
, Human Errors in Predicted Artillery Fire
(0R0-T-113, October, 1952).
3
Page, op_. cit .
, pp. 25-29.
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great bearing on the Department of Defense decision to initiate a de-
tailed study into the Tactical Effectiveness of Weapons Systems (TEWS)
in 1965. The purpose of the TEWS Program is to develop experimental
methodology to measure system effectiveness for all Army weapons
systems. Large costs have necessitated a pilot study for the TEWS
Program, and Combat Developments Command Experimentation Command
(CDCEC) is currently working on this pilot study. The artillery sys-
tem chosen for study in the TEWS Pilot Program is the 155mm howitzer,
self-propelled (M-109) . The measure of effectiveness to be determined
experimentally for this system is called operational hit probability.
In the TEWS Pilot Program, operational hit probabilities are
described as
"...those hit probabilities to be expected when weapon
systems are manned by troops who are subject to the
psychological and physiological stresses of combat.
Such hit probabilities take into account the effects
of terrain, climate, and seasonal changes as well as
variations of tactical situations, e.g., offense, de-
fense, retrograde, and movement to contact. Operational
hit probabilities also include the variations inherent
in considerations of troop fatigue under varying combat
j. . nl
conditions.
It should be noted that this description of operational hit probabilities
is necessarily very general because it must be applied to tactical
weapons systems of many types. When applied to direct fire* weapons
Tactical Effectiveness of Weapons Systems (TEWS) Pilot Program
Plan (Fort Ord, California: USACDCEC, May, 1967), p. 1-9.
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systems, such as the M-60 tank, it seems clear that OHP is the proba-
bility of hitting a point target (such as another tank) under a given
set of conditions. When applied to indirect fire* weapons systems,
such as a FA Weapons System, it is much less clear what the TEWS
description of OHP means. This lack of clarity stems from the fact
that indirect fire weapons systems are employed against both point
and area targets, so what is meant by "a hit" must be clearly stated.
One possible approach is to consider the probability of hitting a
point target under operational conditions. For this interpretation
it would seem reasonable to attempt to measure operational probable
errors,* similar to the inherent probable errors listed in the Tabular
Firing Table. Indications are that CDCEC is taking this approach.
In contrast, the authors are considering the probability (OHP) of
hitting an area target with a volley of artillery fire. Hence, the
experiment we propose will be a methodology to estimate OHP's as
defined in this latter context.
Chapter II of this thesis contains a general description of the
variables involved in estimating OHP's. In Chapter III, we discuss
the required field procedures and propose an experimental design.
A method of analysis of the experimental data is presented in
Chapter IV. Finally, in Chapter V, the authors discuss some areas




Since the basic organization, procedures, tactics, and character-
istics of FA Weapons Systems are similar, it is felt that a general
procedure can be developed which may be used, with minor modifications,
to determine the OHP's of any FA Weapons System.
In their paper on weapons system accuracy, J. Nickel and J. Palmer
divide a weapons system into three basic components: the method of
detection and location of the target, the communications information
link between detector and weapon, and the actual weapon itself. We
shall refer to these three components as target acquisition , communica-
tions , and firing battery , respectively. We shall consider two addi-
tional components, which can be identified as separate entities having
a great deal of influence on the overall operation of the system.
These are survey control , which establishes the location and orienta-
tion of the weapons, and the fire direction center (FDC) , which gener-
ates the firing data to be set on the guns. Meteorological data,
although having an effect on system accuracy, will be assumed accurately
measured for purposes of this experiment. The primary reason for
making this assumption is that true meteorological conditions cannot
be determined, so no basis exists for determining meteorological errors.
James A. Nickel and J. D. Palmer, Methodology Utilized in the
Determination of Weapons System Accuracy Requirements (Norman , Oklahoma
:
University of Oklahoma Research Institute, 16 December 1963), p. 1.
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In addition, it is almost impossible to maintain current meteorological
data, because weather conditions are continually changing. Finally,
we have limited our consideration to the FA battery under battalion
control, and meteorological data comes from a source outside the FA
battalion.
Since the experiment will be conducted under simulated combat con-
ditions, it is necessary to describe a scenario which contains realistic
combat situations. Hence, the scenario for this experiment should be
based, as much as possible, on the current threat, as provided by cur-
rent intelligence.
A suitable measure of effectiveness for a FA Weapons System must
stem from the mission of that system:
"The mission of the field artillery is to provide con-
tinuous and timely fire support to the force commander
,,1
» • • •
In most cases of the type we are considering (neutralization of area
targets) , this mission requires that the field artillery inflict
casualties among the opposing enemy forces.
"The immediate objective is to deliver a mass of accu-
rate and timely fire so that the maximum number of
2
casualties are inflicted."
In these quotations the words "accurate and timely" seem to character-
ize the desired objectives of artillery fire. We feel that OHP
FM 6-20-1. Field Artillery Tactics (Washington: Department of
the Army, 1 July 1965), p. 3.
2
FM 6-40, op_. cit . , p. 1-2.
-16-
provides a suitable measure of effectiveness from the standpoint of
accuracy. We propose to determine OHP's experimentally, and we feel
that it would require little additional effort to simultaneously gather
data relating to the timeliness of the system being studied. Hence,
we propose that the distribution of the lengths of time required to
conduct fire missions be used as a measure of effectiveness for time-
liness .
Although we are primarily interested in the effectiveness of the
weapons system as a whole, it is also desirable to identify those
factors which cause artillery errors, as well as the relative magnitude
of these errors. This additional information should be useful in
seeking methods of improving systems accuracies. For example, if it
were found that large dispersion errors in the center of impact resulted
from incorrect deflection settings, a possible remedy might be to
redesign the deflection scales of the weapon sight. Thus we are seeking
some knowledge of the effect that each of the component parts has on
the operation of the system as a whole. This leads to a discussion of
the independent variables which we propose for the experiment.
Independent Variables
Our selection of independent variables is based upon materiel,
current tactics and techniques, operational environments, and historical
records of artillery operations. Budgetary and time constraints often
preclude the use of all independent variables that the experimentor may
desire. Hence, he may be forced to select a reduced number of
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independent variables, or at least specify priorities to indicate those
independent variables which he feels are most important. We believe
that the following independent variables are critical to the determina-
tion of OHP's. The rationale for the choices is included in the list
of variables.
Method of Entering Fire for Effect . The accuracy of artillery
fire may vary substantially, depending upon what method of entering
fire for effect (FFE*) is used by the FDC. There are three methods
to be considered.
The first of these is the "Adjust Fire" method., in which an
observer estimates the location of an aiming point, usually the target
center. This location is then transmitted to the FDC where it is used
as one of the elements in the computation of firing data. One or more
adjusting rounds are fired using this data; when they detonate in the
impact area, the observer determines corrections relative to the
observer-target line (or the gun-target line in the case of an air
observer) . The observer transmits these corrections to the FDC where
new firing data is computed, and additional adjusting rounds are then
fired. The observer continues adjustment until he senses* that the
center of impact of the adjusting rounds is on the observer-target line,
and within 50 meters of the target, at which time he calls for fire for
effect
.
The remaining two methods of entering FFE are similar to each
other in that no adjustment is conducted. The first method is called
"transfer using registration corrections;" the second, "transfer using
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meteorological plus velocity error corrections." In each case the
observer immediately requests fire for effect because he has a high
degree of confidence that his initial location data is within 50 meters
of the target. This normally occurs when the target is located on or
near a prominent terrain feature, a surveyed location, or a target which
has been fired upon previously.
Visibility Conditions . It is felt that the accuracy of artillery
fire will vary with the time of day (24-hour day)
,
primarily because
the observer has a greatly decreased ability to detect and adjust on
targets during the hours of darkness. The time required to complete
fire missions is expected to increase during the hours of darkness,
because gun crews are required to work with a minimum of artificial
light. Hence, we have divided the 24-hour day into two segments,
"daylight" and "dark."
Fuze . There are three types of fuze commonly used by the Artillery:
point detonating (PD) , mechanical time (MT) , and variable time (VT)
.
The PD fuze functions on impact, and it may be set for either quick
or delayed action. We feel that the delay option should be eliminated
for the purposes of this experiment. Hence, the only "error" which can
occur is the failure of the fuze to function. In contrast there are at
least two sources of error for MT fuze. The FDC computes the MT fuze
setting, and the gun crews put this setting on the fuze. If either the
FDC or the gun crew makes an error, the fuze will detonate before it
reaches the target or after it has passed over the target. It may even
detonate on impact instead of the desired 20 meters above the ground.
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In the case of VT fuze, the FDC computes an "arming time" for the gun
crews to set on the fuze. This "arming time" (a safety setting to
ensure that the projectile clears friendly forces before it becomes
armed) is considerably less than the time of flight to the target. Once
the VT fuze has armed, it should automatically detonate within 20 meters
of any feature which produces a radar "echo."
We have chosen to consider only PD and MT fuzes in this experiment
because VT fuze provides little more data than would already be avail-
able from PD fuze. The only chance for human error with VT fuze is for
the fuze setting actually put on the fuze to be longer than the time of
flight of the projectile. This would require a "gross" error to be
committed by either the FDC or the gun crews. It is felt that such an
event is unlikely, so we eliminate VT fuze from further consideration.
Tactical Situation . -The two most common categories for describing
tactical situations are "offense" and "defense." The defense is pri-
marily a static situation. Forward observers generally have ample time
to study the terrain to their front. Survey teams are able to bring
survey control into all position areas,* and are usually able to do
extensive target area and connecting area survey.
In contrast, the offense is characterized by movement . As the
friendly forces advance, observers are required to conduct fire missions
on unfamiliar terrain, so initial target location errors should be much
larger than in the defense. Survey teams are often delayed in bringing
survey control to firing units, so some batteries may be required to
fire missions from "map-spotted" coordinates until position area survey
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is established. Target area survey and connecting area survey are
rarely done. All of these factors introduce additional error into the
offensive situation. We feel that accuracy of the artillery fire will
be affected; hence, the experiment should be conducted under both
offensive and defensive conditions.
Gun-Target Range . The authors feel that OHP's may vary consid-
erably, depending upon the range from the gun to the target. However,
estimates of OHP's obtained experimentally might have little value if
they are based upon ranges that are not likely to be fired. Therefore,
we propose that the experimentor select three range bands (short, medium,
and long) that are typical of the weapons system being tested. Here we
use the word "typical" to mean those ranges at which enemy targets are
likely to be detected. Hence, the short-range band should include a
high percentage of the short-range missions that are likely to be fired
in future conflicts, and similarly for the medium and long-range bands.
Estimates of the missions that are "likely" to be fired should come from
the predicted distribution of enemy targets as provided by current
intelligence.
Having selected three typical range bands, the experimentor is
faced with another problem: should test units be required to fire an
equal number of missions in each range band, or are there advantages to
having them fire unequal numbers of missions in each range band? For
example, intelligence information may indicate that 70% of all future
missions, for the weapons system being considered, will be fired in the
short-range band. If this were the case, the experimentor might want
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to fire more missions in this range band, in order to ensure that his
estimates of OHP's (for the short-range band) are "good" ones. On the
other hand, it is expected that radial miss distance will have a higher
statistical variance in the long-range band. This conjecture, if true,
would indicate that additional missions should be fired in the long-
range band, in order to obtain better estimates of OHP's there. Finally,
firing equal numbers of missions in each range band would make the data
reduction much easier. This problem is discussed in greater detail in
Appendix C.
Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Environment . When toxic agents are
present in the atmosphere, all personnel must don protective clothing
and protective masks so that they can carry out their missions. The
wearing of such equipment will undoubtedly affect the time required to
perform artillery-related tasks, and it may affect the accuracy of the
fire delivered. In addition, the wearing of protective masks will
probably make communications more difficult. We therefore feel that
the experiment should be conducted under both toxic and non-toxic con-
ditions.
Dependent Variables
A choice of response, or dependent, variables is based upon the
measures of effectiveness chosen for the system. As stated previously,
we have chosen OHP as a measure of the system's accuracy and the dis-
tribution of the lengths of time required to conduct fire missions as
a measure of the system's timeliness. From the standpoint of accuracy,
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we have also expressed an interest in the cause and relative magnitude
of artillery errors. We first concern ourselves with those dependent
variables related to accuracy; namely, OHP and errors of various types.
Later we address the question of timeliness of the system.
Center of Impact of a Volley . The basic requirement for estimating
OHP's for a weapons system is to determine the actual center of impact
of a volley so that it can be compared with the desired center of impact,
The desired center of impact is usually at the target center (aiming
point), and the actual center of impact can be estimated using flash-
base techniques to be described in Chapter III. The results of a series
of firings may be used to develop empirical distributions of the center
of impact about the target center, and OHP's can be estimated from these
distributions. The technique for estimating OHP's will be discussed in
Chapter IV.
OHP provides an overall measure of the system's accuracy, but it
does not provide us with information regarding the cause nor relative
magnitude of artillery errors. This information must be obtained by
examining the components of the system. Thus the dependent variables
of interest in this regard are those which measure component errors;
that is, errors which may be attributed to a single component of the
system.
Target Acquisition Errors . Under operational conditions, target
acquisition errors would fall into three major categories:
1) failure to detect the target,
2) improper identification of the target, and
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3) incorrect location of the target, both initially and with
respect to adjusting rounds.
For experimental purposes, we propose to eliminate errors of the first
two categories by having an umpire designate a target (aiming point)
and identify it for the observer. Thus target acquisition errors to be
considered here are errors in target location only. These errors can
best be described by considering the three methods of entering fire for
effect discussed previously.
Errors in the "Adjust Fire" method of entering fire for effect are
a result of the observer's inability to accurately determine target
location initially, as well as errors in judging the location of the
target with respect to adjusting rounds. In contrast, target location
errors associated with the second two methods of entering fire for
effect, when no adjusting rounds are fired, are due to inaccuracies in
the observer's initial location data only. Other errors may be com-
mitted, regardless of which method of entering fire for effect is used.
We shall discuss some such errors and indicate which components of the
system are involved.
Survey Control Errors . These errors are associated with incorrect
determination or reporting of coordinates of battery centers and azi-
muths of orienting lines.* Survey errors have varying effects on
accuracy, depending upon the fire procedure being used. In the case
of "Adjust Fire" or "transfer using registration corrections," the
survey errors are "shot out" during adjustment and registration,
respectively. Therefore, survey errors would affect only the time
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irequired to adjust on a new target. The accuracy of the rounds in FFE
would not be affected in either of these procedures.
Survey errors have the greatest adverse effect on accuracy when
entering fire for effect using "meteorological plus velocity error
corrections." In this case, there is neither an adjustment nor a prior
registration, so all survey errors are incorporated in the firing data
that is sent to the guns.
Fire Direction Center Errors . In this category we shall consider
only errors that are actually generated within the FDC. That is, all
inputs to the FDC (e.g., survey, target location, and meteorological
data) will be assumed correct so that only errors in the computation
of firing data will be assigned to the FDC.
Errors generated within the FDC can adversely affect both the time
required to complete a fire mission and the accuracy of the rounds in
FFE. Although there are a great number of places where errors can be
committed in the FDC, our primary concern is the data that is transmitted
to the firing battery for use in FFE. These errors can take the form of
incorrect quadrant elevation,* deflection,* and (in the case of missions
requiring MT fuze) the setting to be placed on the fuze.
Firing Battery Errors . Here, as with the FDC, we shall consider
only errors actually generated within the firing battery. All inputs
to the firing battery will be assumed correct.
We can divide firing battery errors into two groups: those which
directly affect the fall of shot and those which cause incorrect inputs
to other components of the system. Errors of the first type are
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incorrect initial lay of battery, incorrect lay (either in deflection
or quadrant elevation) of the individual pieces prior to firing, errors
in mechanical time fuze settings, and errors in the charge fired.
Examples of the second type of error would be the incorrect measurement
or reporting of powder temperature or projectile weight.
Communication Errors . These errors are due to communications
between system components, not within the separate components. Such
errors are caused by poor radio-telephone procedures or faulty equipment.
Any message that is misunderstood by a radio-telephone operator of the
artillery unit and is recorded incorrectly by him is considered a com-
munication error. Such errors observed in the experiment should be
analyzed to determine their effect on the firing data that is set on
the guns. Some communications errors may not affect the firing data;
for example, the umpire identifies a survey party for the observer, but
the observer tells the FDC that the target is a wire crew. Other com-
munications errors, such as the transposition of figures by a receiving
operator, may have a very adverse effect on accuracy.
Residual Errors . These errors are encountered primarily as a
result of imperfect experimental controls. All errors not previously
mentioned, regardless of source, would be included in this category.
Therefore, if the experimentor were to measure all component errors and
then calculate their total effect on the fall of shot, he should be able
to predict where the center of impact will occur. If the actual CI does
not agree with this prediction, the difference is due to residual errors.
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One example of a residual error is an error in meteorological data,
since all meteorological data was assumed to be correct. Another
example of a residual error is a "round-off" error. These occur because
only integers may be set on the scales of the weapons.
Dependent Variables (Timeliness)
We now consider the measure of the system's timeliness. Although
accuracy is usually of paramount concern to artillery units, there are
occasions when speed of delivery of fires takes precedence. Such
instances are a matter of judgment of the commander and may warrant
deviations from the normal procedures. Training doctrine requires that:
"All members of the artillery team must be continually
indoctrinated with a sense of urgency."
In addition to the distribution of the lengths of time required to con-
duct fire missions, we also propose to observe the lengths of time
required by certain components of the FA Weapons System. Again, it is
desirable to learn what effect the components of the system have on the
measure of effectiveness being investigated, so that we may seek
possible methods of improvement.
Total Fire Mission Time . Total fire mission time should be meas-
ured from the time that an observer detects a target until the FFE
rounds burst in the target area. The following procedures could be
used by an umpire when designating a target to an observer: the umpire
would describe the target (e.g., platoon of infantry in the open), give
angular measurements to the target, and describe the object that is to
1




be used as the aiming point (e.g., a red car body). For this experiment
detection occurs when the observer sees the aiming point (the red car
body) and states, "target identified."
Component Times . In order to determine the contribution of the
component parts to the total fire mission time, the following measure-
ments should be taken.
1) Target acquisition time should be measured from the time the
observer detects a target until he initiates a request for a fire
mission with the FDC. Adjustment time should be measured from the
appearance of an adjusting burst in the target area until the first
element of adjustment data is transmitted to the FDC.
2) Survey time should be measured from the time that the battalion
survey control point is identified by the survey party until the battery
center and orienting line are marked.
3) Fire direction center time should be measured as follows:
a) For missions using one of the non-adjusting methods, the
time increment should be measured from the receipt of a request for fire
until the last element (quadrant elevation) of FFE data is transmitted
to the firing battery.
b) For missions using the "Adjust Fire" method, the time
increment described above should be summed with increments computed in
a similar manner for rounds in adjustment.
4) Firing battery time should be measured as follows:
a) For missions using one of the non-adjusting methods, the
time increment should be measured from the receipt of the last element
of the firing data from the FDC until the guns are fired.
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b) For missions using the "Adjust Fire" method, the time
increment as described above should be summed for both the adjusting
fire and rounds in FFE.
Controlled Variables
We now proceed to a discussion of controlled variables. Conditions
are usually controlled so that the experimentor can attribute changes
in the dependent variables (up to random errors) to the values of the
independent variables. In addition, controls are often imposed in
order to limit the magnitude of the experiment, since each additional
variable (of two treatments) would increase the number of data cells
by a factor of two. We consider three states of control: rigid,
systematic, and uncontrolled.
Rigidly Controlled Variables . The following variables are those
which the authors feel should be rigidly controlled:
1) Sheaf width.* The battery should be deployed to give a par-
allel, or normal, sheaf. The width of the sheaf will depend upon the
caliber of the weapons in the unit being tested.
2) Length of Survey. A fixed length of survey should be used.
The exact length can be determined after the site of the experiment is
selected.
3) Type of Ammunition. The preponderance of all ammunition fired,
both in combat and in training, is high explosive. Therefore we feel
that only high explosive ammunition should be used during the experiment.
In addition, sufficient ammunition of a given lot should be available to
ensure that no "mixed-lot" missions* are fired.
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4) Unit Training. All artillery units are required to take, and
pass , an Army Training Test (ATT) on an annual basis. The authors feel
that all units should again be tested at the experimental site prior to
conducting the experiment. This test, by a single team of umpires, will
ensure that all units to be used in the experiment meet the minimum
level of training proficiency required by the Army.
5) Angle of Fire. Only low angle fire (less than 800 mils for
most weapons) should be used in this experiment. Low angle fire is more
accurate than high angle fire, while the latter is more lethal against
certain types of targets. Since analysis using these methods as vari-
ables would necessitate expanding the experiment into areas of limited
application, we propose the above restraint.
Systematically Controlled Variables . Systematic controls also
serve to limit the size of the experiment. Additionally, these controls
assist in making the simulated combat conditions of the experimental
environment more representative of true combat conditions. The only
variable considered in this category should be target occurrence time.
Using the independent variable "Visibility Condition," we have already
broken the 24-hour day into "day" and "night." However, past experience
indicates that targets do not occur uniformly over either of these
periods. Enemy attacks most frequently occur in the early morning, so
we feel that a test unit should be required to fire more missions
between, say, 0500 and 0600 than between 2300 and 2400. This could be
accomplished by distributing target occurrence times in the scenario
according to historical data that is available. The OHP's thus obtained
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would be "averaged" over the times at which enemy targets are likely
to appear.
Uncontrolled Variables . Certain variables are uncontrolled,
usually because it is too expensive, or too difficult, to control them.
Variables that fall into this category are as follows:
1) Terrain and Vegetation. These will ultimately depend upon the
experimental site selected. A prime consideration in selecting a test
site is the availability of units near the site. It is also desirable
to select test sites that have, as nearly as possible, "typical" terrain.
2) Weather. Weather will depend upon the test site and the season.
Testing under "extreme" weather conditions, of any sort, should be
avoided if possible.
3) Combat Realism. Every effort should be made to develop a test
scenario that will include, as nearly as possible, the psychological and




We have thus far described the conditions that we feel should be
varied or controlled in order to observe possible changes in the
dependent variables. In this chapter we outline a general procedure
that should be followed both in preparation for, and conduct of, the
experiment in the field. A linear statistical model, which could be
used during the data analysis phase of the experiment, is also pre-
sented.
Sequence of Field Procedures
For this experiment a test unit should consist of one randomly
selected firing battery (from a particular battalion) , the battalion
FDC, and one survey team. In Appendix C the authors describe a method
for obtaining an initial estimate of the required number of test units.
Once this estimate has been obtained, the battalions to furnish test
units should be randomly selected from available battalions. If the
estimated required number of test units were to exceed the number of
available battalions, possibly because of the limited number of active
battalions or for combat reasons, the experiment could still be con-
ducted. However, it must be remembered that the level of confidence in
the estimated parameters would be lowered accordingly.
Each test unit should be assigned a sequence number, which will
identify the order in which the experiment would be conducted for that




Day 1 Arrive at test site; receive administrative briefing and
orientation.
2 Draw equipment; prepare for field operations.
3 Receive detailed briefing about the experiment and conduct
the pre-experiment ATT; prepare for movement to the field.
4-5 Conduct ATT; receive briefing on results.
6-7 Maintain equipment and prepare for the experiment.
8-10 Receive alert order, load vehicles, move to assembly area,
and prepare for defensive operations. Move to defensive
positions (as required by the scenario) and conduct fire
missions.
11-13 Receive orders to prepare to support an attack; conduct
operations in support of an attack.
14-16 Receive orders to remain in position and support defensive
operations; be prepared to continue the attack on order.
17-19 Continue the attack.
20-21 Return to base camp; maintain equipment; return equipment
to the supply point; receive critique from test team.
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order of tactical situations. This order would be followed by all units
having odd sequence numbers. Even-numbered units would follow the
alternating schedule of tactical situations, starting with the offense.
By mixing the order of tactical situations, bias due to fatigue and
learning should be averaged over the two situations.
Once the experiment begins, the test units will be in simulated
combat continuously for the duration of the experiment, thereby
increasing the psychological and physiological stresses to which per-
sonnel are subjected. The testing period of twelve days, suggested in
Table 1, would have to be adjusted depending upon the firing matrix
used (see Figures 1 and 2) and the number of volleys to be fired in
each data cell. Time must be allowed for registration, moves, and
normal tactical activities, so a reasonable work load should be approxi-
mately 12-16 fire missions per period of light condition (daylight and
dark) . The order of fire missions should be determined at random and
integrated into the detailed scenario.
The experiment should be conducted in the following five phases.
1) Alert test units; inform them of their arrival time at the
experimentation site; ensure that test units have satisfactorily com-
pleted an ATT 60 days (at most) prior to the test period; move test
units to the test site.
2) Orient test units; have them draw equipment and prepare for
field operations.
3) Conduct Army Training Test at the test site.






























5) Conduct intermediate data reduction and, if possible, update
the estimate of the number of test units required.
Data Collection
Data should be collected by teams of umpires assigned to the four
activities described below. The kinds of data to be collected and the
instrumentation will be discussed. Pre-printed blank forms should be
used for recording data, and should be turned in to the control head-
quarters daily. All time measurements should be made using stopwatches,
and need not be recorded more accurately than one-tenth of a second.
Target Location . The target location umpire team should accompany
the observers and record target location data that is transmitted by
the observer to the FDC. This information would be recorded in addition
to surveyed target information. Target location time and total fire
mission time should also be measured and recorded by this team.
Fire Direction Center . The umpire team located within the FDC
should observe each step in the computation of a fire mission, and
record any errors or malpractices that are observed. This team should
tape-record all communications between the FDC and both the observer
and the firing battery. Any errors in information transferred should
be recorded when they are observed. The tapes would be analyzed later
to discover any undetected errors and to verify those already recorded.
All firing charts and FDC computation forms should be collected daily
for later analysis. This umpire team should also measure FDC time as
described previously.
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Firing Battery . The umpire team observing operations with the
firing battery should monitor all activities associated with gunnery
procedures, to include registration, laying the battery, and emplacing
aiming posts. All observed errors and malpractices should be recorded.
One umpire should be assigned to each gun crew so that minimum delay is
caused by umpire activities. Salvo fire* should be used in all fire
missions, even though the simulated tactical conditions may indicate
that all weapons should be fired simultaneously. This type of fire
would allow the operators manning the flash-base in the target area to
observe each round individually, in order to estimate the CI more accu-
rately. The sight picture and scale settings should be checked each
time (before and after) a weapon is fired. Fuze settings should be
checked just prior to loading the projectile into the gun. Any errors
due to radio-telephone operation should be recorded as they are detected.
These errors may be analyzed later against the taped record. The firing
battery time should be measured by this team.
A photographic scheme of recording the sight picture, scale readings,
and fuze settings might be useful if excessive time delays are attributed
to the umpire team, or the umpire's accuracy in reading scales is ques-
tioned. Pictures of the scales could be taken and later analyzed for
errors. The introduction of such a scheme of data collection might be
a result of a pilot study.
Target Area . The umpire team in the target area will operate the
flash-base, which could be used to estimate the location of each round
fired, including rounds in registration and adjustment. An ad hoc
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"dual" flash-base, Figure 3, is proposed by the authors. Two optical
instruments would be operated from each of four observation posts (OP's).
The two instruments should be positioned as close together as possible,
without blocking the other's line of sight to the targets. It is felt
that such an arrangement might prove more accurate and workable than a
flash-base with eight OP's, for the following reasons.
1) The close proximity of the instruments would allow voice com-
munications between the operators. Since the scale readings should be
quite similar, errors in reading the scales should be discovered
immediately.
2) Large pointing errors should be discovered by the recorder,
who would sight over the instrument for each round. If a large differ-
ence between the two angles is reported, the recorder's observation
should aid in determining which instrument is in error.
3) Finally, the number of rounds "lost," or not observed by an
OP, should be minimized because of the "built-in" redundancy.
All instruments should be oriented on a distant reference point
before and after each fire mission in order to minimize errors due to
faulty instrument alignment. The deflection and vertical angles should
be measured for all air bursts, but only the deflection angle need be
measured for ground bursts. If both instrument operators at an OP
observe a burst, the deflection (and vertical) angles will be averaged
to give the "OP deflection (and OP vertical) angle(s)" for that round.
In the event only one instrument operator at a particular OP observes
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Although there could be many variations to the problem of "lost"
rounds, we shall consider only the situation in which one OP (i.e.,
both instruments) fails to observe a given round. In this case, that
OP would not be used to estimate the location of the "lost" round;
instead, the "OP angle (s)" for that OP would be constructed to the
location (of the "lost" round) determined by the remaining three OP's.
This location would be estimated using the same general procedures
(described below) as for locating the center of impact. Finally,
should two or more OP's fail to observe a burst, other analyses would
be necessary.
The center of impact would be estimated by an intersection pro-
cedure. The "OP angles" to each round of a volley should be averaged
to give a "CI deflection angle" from each OP. A ray would be plotted
from each OP in the direction of the "CI deflection angle," using a
point mid-way between the two instruments as its origin. The inter-
section of these rays forms a polygon. For "tight" polygons the
geometric center would be taken as the estimate of the location of the
CI, in the horizontal plane. Other situations (i.e., "loose" polygons)
would be analyzed on an individual basis (see Chapter V) . An average
height of burst would be determined, in the case of an air burst, by
averaging the heights of burst computed from each OP using the "CI
vertical angle," and the estimated distance to the CI.
The flash-base personnel should know (in advance) which target is
being fired upon, when each gun is fired, and the approximate time of
flight. Coordinates of the flash-base OP's and target locations should
be established by survey.
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The Experimental Dt .- ;± gn
In order to determin< , wt have suggested thac accuracy data
be taken under various combinations of values of the independent vari-
ables (see Figu.es 1 and 2), On each, trial the measurements taken will
determine the radial miss cJ nee, R, between the center of impact and
the target center- The obsei >ns on radial miss distance may be
used in estimating
OHP = Pr[R2 i r 2 ] = F_ 2 (r 2 ) .R
A method of estimating this cumulative distribution function is discussed
in Chapter IV
Radial miss distance is measured in the standard 3-coordinate sys-
tem where the X-axis Is taken aicng the gun-target line and lies in a
horizontal plane tangent to the earth at the target center. In the case
of time fuze missions, this tangent plane passes through an aiming point
20 meters above the target center The Y-axis is taken at right angles
to the X-axis at the target, center, and lies in the same horizontal
plare. The Z-axis is perpendicular to both che X and Y axes at their




is the true mean miss distance for the center of impact
(in each .ell), tatcen in the p direction; p - X, Y,
or Z. The ranges of the subscripts are described below-
is the random error in the p direction on the observed
random friable for che o v alley; o = 1, 2> 3, . .. n.;
where n is the number of volleys to be fired in a
t h




P is the effect in the p direction due to the ±
t
method
used when entering fire for effect; i = 1, 2, 3.
R. is the effect in the p direction due to the j range
band; j = 1, 2, 3, ... The upper limit is unspecified
to allow for expansion, should it be feasible to fire
more than three range bands.
L,
P is the effect in the p direction due to the k light
condition; k = 1, 2.
F is the effect in the p direction due to the I type
of fuze used; I = 1, 2.
T is the effect in the p direction due to the m
m
tactical situation; m = 1, 2.
C p is the effect in the p direction due to the nuclear,
n
biological, or chemical contamination; n = 1, 2.
The usual notation for linear experimental models lists each of the
main effects terms as given above and all appropriate interaction terms.
However, we can simplify this notation considerably by employing the
notation suggested by Graybill. We propose the following model, which
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is assumed to be a set of uncorrelated random variables,ljkicmno '
each of which is distributed N(.0,o 2 ). In equation (1), X.., „
p ijk£inno
denotes the X-coordinate of the o volley in the cell when the factors
M, R, L, F, T, and C are at the i , j , k , I , m , and n levels,
respectively, and similarly for the Y and Z coordinates.
The N-way classification model should include interaction terms,
and tests of their significance in the experiment should be made. Also,
if it were found that there is not a significant difference among the
main effects of certain factors in the experiment, then the data in
these cells could be pooled when estimating operational hit probabilities.




ESTIMATING OPERATIONAL HIT PROBABILITIES
Recall that we have defined OHP as the probability that the center
of impact of a volley of artillery fire will fall within a specified
distance of an aiming point. In symbols,
OHP = Pr[R 2 < r 2 ] = F_ 2 (r 2 ) (1)R
where R is radial miss distance (i.e., the distance from the center
of impact of a volley to the target), and F 2 (r 2 ) is the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of R 2 . Under a specific set of experi-
mental conditions, our ability to accurately estimate OHP (for a given
r) will depend upon our accuracy in estimating the CDF of R2 .
We propose two procedures that might be used in estimating this
CDF. First, an attempt should be made to determine whether one of the
"well known" theoretical probability distributions "fits" either the
distribution of R2 , or the distribution of some function of R2 . In
the event such a distribution cannot be found, the sample CDF (ogive)
could be used.
We begin by discussing a procedure for attempting to find a "well
known" distribution that "fits" a function of R2 . It has been assumed
that the components (X, Y, and Z) of radial miss distance are distributed
N(0,a 2 ); p = X, Y, Z. The target center, or aiming point, will be
considered to be the origin of the 3-dimensional coordinate system
described earlier. We estimate the X-coordinate population variance




















n is the number of volleys fired for a particular set of
experimental conditions, and
X. is the distance in the X direction between the target
center and the CI for the i volley.
Similar computations would be made to determine a 2 and a 2,.
In Appendix B we state reasons why we feel that cR2 /d will be an
approximately Chi-square distributed random variable with c 2 /d degrees
of freedom, where c = a 2 + a 2 + a 2 and d = ait + ait + a|t. Note thatX Y Li X Y Z
equation (1) can be rewritten as
OHP = Pr[cR 2 /d < cr 2 /d] = F
cR2/d (cr
2 /d) = F
R2
(r 2 ). (2)
That is, estimating the CDF of cR 2 /d is equivalent to estimating the
CDF of R 2 . Replacing the parameters c and d by their estimates
(i.e., c = a 2 + a 2 + a 2 and d! = ait + ait + a£) , we obtain an estimateX Y Z X Y Z
of the mean of the approximating Chi-square distribution of cR2 /d. A
goodness-of-fit test (such as Chi-square or Kolmogorov-Smirnov) could
be used to test whether the experimental data "fits" this approximating
Chi-square distribution. If the test shows an acceptable fit, this
distribution could be used to estimate OHP for any value of r. If the
Chi-square distribution does not provide an acceptable fit, a search of




AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
While writing this thesis, we have encountered certain problems
toward which (we feel) further research effort might profitably be
directed. Lack of time has prevented us from working on these problems
in detail. This paper is concluded with a brief description of these
problems. It is hoped that additional work will be directed toward
solving some of them.
One problem is the development of an optimal flash-base for use in
accurately locating shell bursts. The authors have presented an ad hoc
flash-base configuration in this paper, but they feel that further
investigation might lead to a method of designing better ones. Several
important questions should be addressed: How many observation posts
should be used in a flash-base? How many optical instruments should be
located at each observation post? What are the trade-offs between
accuracy and the number of observation posts (and the number of optical
instruments at each)?
Another problem involves the trade-offs between high angle and low
angle fire. The former is more lethal against certain types of targets,
but the latter is more accurate. What are the OHP's of various weapons
systems using high angle fire? Do observers require more, or fewer,
rounds to adjust on a target when high angle fire is used? Under what
conditions is high angle fire preferred to low angle fire?
Experimentation of the type discussed in this paper is generally
quite expensive. Thus, it is desirable to develop additional methods of
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obtaining meaningful measures of a system's effectiveness. In Appendix C
the authors propose the use of ATT data to estimate sample sizes and the
number of missions that should be fired in various range bands. These
considerations suggest several questions: Is there a high correlation
between the estimates of OHP determined experimentally and estimates
determined from ATT data? What modifications (either in scenario or in
data collection procedures) in the ATT would be necessary in order to
obtain "good" estimates of OHP from ATT data? Is it possible to collect
data (for estimating OHP and other measures of effectiveness) under
actual combat conditions? If so, what procedures and instrumentation
should be used?
The "Adjust Fire" method of entering fire for effect presents a
fruitful area for further research. This procedure has been used to
adjust fire on targets for a number of years, but apparently no study
has been made to determine if a better procedure might be developed.
Several questions need to be answered: Is the observer's procedure of
"splitting brackets" best (in some sense) , or should some other proced-
ure be used? How many weapons should be fired during the adjustment
phase? What procedure will yield the greatest expected level of damage
to targets of various types for a given cost?
The procedure currently followed for precision (destruction and
registration) fire should be closely examined. In a precision mission
the observer follows the "Adjust Fire" procedure until he enters FFE.
Once the FFE phase is entered, the observer only senses the rounds
(e.g., "over-left," "short-right," "short-line," etc.), and the FDC
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uses a standard procedure (described in detail in FM 6-40) to further
adjust the fire onto the target. Is this "standard procedure" best?
If not, what procedure should be used?
Finally, the authors feel that hand computational procedures in the
FDC should be compared with the Field Artillery Data Computer (FADAC).
What are the advantages /disadvantages of the FADAC versus hand computa-
tion? Which gives the greater chance for error? Is the inability to
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Area Target - Target, for gunfire or bombing, which covers a large area.
Area targets are usually composed of many point targets that are
distributed within some geographical area.
Center of Impact - The geometrical center of the dispersion pattern of
a group of rounds. In the case of a single volley, it is the
center of this one volley.
Deflection - 1) Setting on the scales of the sight of a weapon to place
the line of fire in the desired direction. 2) Horizontal clock-
wise angle between the axis of the tube and line of sight.
Direct Fire - Fire delivered at close range, by an artillery weapon or
a tank, on a target which is visible to the gunner.
Fire for Effect - Consists of a number of rounds fired singly or in
groups or volleys in sufficient volume to attain the desired effect
on a target.
Indirect Fire - Fire delivered at a target that cannot be seen from the
gun position.
Inherent Errors - If a number of rounds from the same lot of ammunition
are fired from a single weapon with identical settings in quadrant
elevation and deflection, all the rounds will not fall at a single
point, but will be scattered in a pattern of bursts. This disper-
sion is due to inherent errors, which are a result of conditions
in the bore of the gun, conditions in the carriage of the gun, and
environmental conditions during the flight of the projectile.
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Mixed-Lot-Mission - A fire mission in which the ammunition comes from
more than one manufacturer's lot. (Firing corrections may vary
for different lots.)
Non-Standard Firing Conditions - Certain atmospheric, position, and
materiel conditions are accepted as standard. These conditions
are described in the introduction to firing tables. Any other
firing conditions are considered to be non-standard.
Operational Probable Errors - Probable errors* measured under opera-
tional conditions.
Orienting Line - A line of known direction established on the ground
and used as a reference line in survey or in aiming artillery
pieces.
Point Target - A particular object or structure such as a man, a bridge,
or a bunker.
Position Area - The area in which the command and firing elements of a
battery are located.
Probable Errors - Measure of the distribution of impacts about the
mean point of impact for a single weapon; it is also defined as
that error which is exceeded approximately as often as it is not
exceeded.
Quadrant Elevation - The smaller angle at the origin, measured in a
vertical plane, from the base of the trajectory to the line of
elevation. (The base of the trajectory is the straight line from
the origin to a point on the descending branch of the trajectory
which is at the same altitude as the origin.) Roughly speaking,
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this is the vertical angle measured between the axis of the gun
tube and the horizontal plane.
Salvo Fire - A method of fire in which weapons are discharged one after
the other, usually at intervals of two seconds.
Sensing - The location of a point of burst or impact, or mean point of
burst or impact, with respect to the target, such as over, short,
air, left, or right.
Sheaf Width - The lateral distance (perpendicular to the direction of
fire) between the mean points of burst of the flank rounds.
System Errors - The bias and dispersion, about the target center or
aiming point, of fire delivered by weapons systems. They are
attributable to both inherent errors and errors caused by the
operational environment.
Volley Fire - A method of fire in which each section fires a specified
number of rounds without attempting to synchronize its fires with
the other sections.
Weapons System - One or more weapons with all component parts, person-
nel, and procedures required for its operation. The operation of
the system is initiated when a target is detected and terminated
upon completion of firing.
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APPENDIX B
THE APPROXIMATING CHI-SOUARE DISTRIBUTION
We now consider the problem of finding the distribution (or
approximate distribution) of a sum of squares of independent* but not
identically distributed , normal random variables. That is, we wish to
find the distribution of R2 = X2 + Y 2 + Z 2
, where the variables are
as described in Chapter III. Assume that X is distributed N(0,a 2 ),X
Y is distributed N(0,a 2 ), Z is distributed N(0,a 2 ), and suppose
the random variables are independent . The approximate distribution of
o 1
R^ is given by the following theorem:
Let n.X./a 2 (i = 1,2 k) be independently distributed as x 2 (n . ).
k k
Let y ~ \ g.o
2 (y > 0) > and g = £ g.X.. Then u ng/y is
.-.XX -. X X1=1 1=1






As a consequence of our assumptions of independent normality,
X2 /o 2 , Y 2 /a 2 and Z 2 /a 2 are independently distributed as X 2 (D« BYA I h
letting g. = 1, we get y = a 2 + a| + a| and g = X2 + Y2 + Z 2 - R2 .
/a 2 + o* + o*\
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The sample size for an experiment might be based upon the following
criteria:
1) the assumed distributions of the random variables to be
observed during the experiment,
2) certain goals (possibly arbitrary) in estimating the chosen
parameters,
3) the cost of sampling, and
4) the availability of the members of the population to be sampled,
If we initially assume that the availability and cost constraints are
not active, then "required sample size" would mean the predicted sample
size necessary to achieve the stated goals, given that the random vari-
ables will be sampled from the specified distributions. Even in this
"ideal case," the problem of determining required sample size for an
experiment is a difficult one. There is seldom agreement as to which
goal should be selected, and it is difficult to predict, a priori , the
distributions of the random variables to be observed during the experi-
ment. After some consideration, the experimentor must make a decision
as to which goals he considers most important. Once this decision is
made, it may be possible to estimate the required sample size, provided
inferences can be drawn about the distributions of the random variables
involved. The latter may be done in various ways. For example, some-
times personnel who have had experience with similar experiments can
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furnish subjective inferences concerning the likely distributions of
the experimental random variables. On other occasions available data,
similar to the data which will be collected during the experiment, may
be used in drawing inferences about the distributions of these random
variables. In still other cases, theoretical developments may indicate
appropriate distribution assumptions, or literature may be available
which sheds light upon the distributions likely to be encountered.
After the required sample size has been estimated, the experimentor
should, in most cases, check whether the cost or availability (of
sample units) constraints are violated. If either constraint is vio-
lated, the required sample size might have to be reduced accordingly.
During annual Army Training Tests, accuracy data is recorded for
all artillery units. The authors feel that this data might be similar
to the accuracy data that would be obtained (later) in the experiment,
so ATT data might be useful in estimating the required sample size.
The phrase "required sample size" is used here in two senses: the
number of volleys that should be fired in each data cell and the number
of units that should be used in firing those volleys. Our suggested
procedure for obtaining these estimates will be essentially the same
as previously discussed; that is, first estimate each required sample
size by considering some stated goal and the inferred distribution
(based on ATT accuracy data and theoretical considerations) of the
experimental random variables, then check to see if a cost constraint
or an availability constraint is active.
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As was stated in Chapter IV, our ability to accurately estimate OHP
(for a given r) will depend upon our accuracy in estimating the CDF
of R2 . For the reasons given in Appendix B, we feel that cR2 /d will
be an approximately Chi-square distributed random variable with c 2 /d
degrees of freedom, where c = a 2 + a 2 + a 2 and d * oil + ait + a!t.
X Y Z X Y Z
Hence, the quality of our OHP estimates could very well be assumed to
depend upon our ability to accurately estimate c 2/d, the mean of the
approximating Chi-square distribution. However, c 2 /d is solely a
function of the variances of X, Y, and Z, the miss distances in the
coordinate directions. Therefore, our ability to accurately estimate
c2 /d will depend upon our accuracy in estimating these three variances
from experimental data . The difficulty lies in the fact that experi-
mental data will not be available until after the experiment is conducted.
Hence, the authors propose that estimates of required sample sizes should
be based upon accuracy data that is currently available; namely, ATT data.
During ATT's, flash-base techniques are used to estimate the points
of impact of individual rounds in FFE, and a center of impact is com-
puted. Since height-of-burst data is not recorded, it is impossible to
estimate the variance (a 2 ) of miss distance in the Z-coordinate direc-
mm
tion. However, under the normality assumptions of Appendix B, the maxi-
mum likelihood estimate of a 2 would be
X
n
5 2 = s 2 - I (X. - X)
2
,
n *- 1X X i=l
and similarly for a 2 . For low-angle fire, the variance in range will
probably exceed the variance in deviation; that is, in past experience,
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S^ has almost always been greater than S^. It is reasonable to assume,
X i
therefore, that a£ will "drive" the problem. In other words, if we
choose a sample size that will achieve some stated degree of accuracy in
estimating o^, we should be assured of achieving a higher degree of
accuracy in estimating a^ and a^ in the experiment. Therefore, we
have considered only the problem of estimating a£ to the required pre-
cision in order to obtain an estimate of the required number of volleys
for each data cell. Any of a number of other schemes could be used as
well.
For their stated goal, the authors have decided to require the
expected length of a 1 - a per cent confidence interval on 0%. to be
x
equal to the burst radius (B_) of a projectile of the appropriate type.
If X (miss distance parallel to the gun-target line) is normally dis-
tributed, nS^/a^ is distributed as a Chi-square random variable with
x x
n - 1 degrees of freedom. A 1 - a per cent confidence interval on
a£ can be obtained as follows:
X f
1 - a - Er[ XJ.a/2 < nS|/ 2 < x^l
*'
'
'- PrEnSX/)<a/2 " °X ' »SX/xl-o/2 ] '
where n is the total number of observations on the random variable X,
and X 2 /o is the 100(l-a/2) percentile of the Chi-square distribution
with n - 1 degrees of freedom. Equating the expected length of this
confidence interval to the burst radius, one obtains





\ Xl-a/2 Xa/2 /
The burst radius of the particular projectile being used in the experi-
ment would be known, and a^ can be estimated by S?. from ATT accuracy
data. Thus (2) can be solved for n, the required number of volleys
for each data cell. Note, however, that n also specifies the particu-
lar Chi-square distribution from which the X 2 /? and x 2 /? points
are determined, and a solution for n must take this into account. An
iterative procedure may be used: first choose n, and then check to
see if (2) is satisfied. If not, choose a different n and recheck (2).
If so, determine whether a smaller n will satisfy (2). Continue in
this fashion until the smallest integer n that most nearly satisfies
(2) is found. This iteration process should not be very time-consuming,
since very few iterations (usually less than 10) should be required to
find the appropriate n.
Available ATT data, pertaining to numerous artillery units (of the
given type), firing at many different ranges, under various firing con-
ditions, would be used to estimate n by the above procedure. The
estimate n (of required sample size) thus obtained would represent
the number of volleys to be fired (in each data cell) by "average" units
in "average" situations. Therefore, 48n would seem to be a reasonable
estimate of N, the total number of volleys to be fired in the experi-
ment (using the reduced firing matrix of 48 data cells).
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While 48n represents the total required sample size, it may be pos-
sible to allocate these observations in a way "more efficient" than
simply n to a cell. We shall illustrate this with a consideration of
the allocation over range bands. In Chapter II, we suggested that the
independent variable "Gun-Target Range" be divided into three repre-
sentative range bands. The firing of n volleys in each data cell
would not take into account available information concerning these range
bands. Specifically, the authors feel that intelligence information and
previous accuracy data should be used as a basis for estimating the
number of missions to be fired in each range band. The intelligence
information might, for example, take the form of a predicted distribution
of enemy targets, as shown in Figure 4. The accuracy data could be pro-
vided from the ATT data (already used in estimating a 2 ) , segregated by
A.
range band. The following discussion shows one method of using this
information to obtain reasonable allocations of the number of missions
to be fired in each range band. For the sake of simplicity, we consider
only the short-range band (R.B.//1) and the medium-range band (R.B.#2).
However, the development is general and could be extended to any number
of range bands.
As stated previously, the accuracy of an estimate of OHP will depend,
among other factors, upon our ability to determine experimentally the
CDF's of R2 . To obtain "good" estimates of these CDF's, it is necessary
to accurately measure the observed R 2 for each volley fired. A reason-
able approach toward achieving the desired degree of accuracy might be
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squared radial miss distances, for each range band. The sense in which
we use the word "best" is discussed below.
We shall use the following notation:
X. is miss distance parallel to the gun-target line in range
b and i , i = 1 , 2 ;
Y. is miss distance perpendicular to the gun-target line (in the
horizontal plane) in range band i ;
Z. is vertical miss distance in range band i.
1
Additionally, we make the following assumptions.
1) X. is distributed N(0,oj ), i = 1, 2 ;
i
Y. is distributed N(0,a^ );
i
Z. is distributed N(0,a^ ).
1
2) The predicted distribution of enemy targets indicates that, in
a total of V + W missions fired, it is expected that V missions will
be fired in range band #1 and W missions in range band #2.
3) No more than N missions may be fired during the experiment.
Note that the number n may be equal to 48n (determined previously) , or
it may be provided by a budgetary or other constraint, whichever is
smaller. Thus our problem is one of allocating N observations, between




where R? = X? + Y? + Z?, i = 1, 2.
l l l l
The word "best" may be interpreted in terms of minimal quadratic
loss. Toward this end, we have assumed the following loss functions for











= (yR2 " yR2)2 given R.B.#1
L2^ yR2 ^
=
^R2 ~ UR2 ^
2 given R.B.#2
.
It is well-known that L.<{i 2 ) is minimized by taking y_2 * r2 « ^e1 K
i *£ l
total expected loss, E[L], is given by
E[L] = pL^R2 ) + qL
2
(R2 ) ,
where p = —— is the probability of firing a mission in R,B.#1, and
W
q = (1-p) = 77777 is the probability of firing a mission in R.B.#2„
Note that p and q may be interpreted as prior probabilities on the
distributions of R2 and R2 , respectively-
Let n. (unknown) be the number of missions that should be fired
in R, B.//1 and n (unknown) be the number of missions for R.B.#2. Then
our problem reduces to the following:
MINIMIZE: p(R2 - u 2 ) 2 + q(R2 - y_ 2)21
*1 l R2 (3)
SUBJECT TO: n + n. = N .
By making the appropriate substitutions, system (3) can be rewritten as:
MINIMIZE: ^ Var(R2 ) + 7^ Var(If)
(A)
SUBJECT TO: n + n = N
,





and Var[R|] = 2(a£ + a£ + a£ )/n
2
-
(These variances will be derived below.)
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2
The positive constant term rr-rr will not affect the minimization,V+w
so it may be deleted. Finally, we have

















SUBJECT TO: n + n = N .
The Lagrangian for the system (5) may be written as:

















Taking partial derivatives and setting them equal to zero, we get:


















|f = nx + n2 - N = .
Solving the first two partial derivative expressions for A, one obtains
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2 sj Xo^ + ^ + oJi
As mentioned previously, ATT data does not include Z-coordinate





deleted. Replacing the remaining squared variances in (7) by their maxi-




















where sj = ± J (X - X ) 2 ,
a.. m




X. = - I X. . ,1 m ,*', li1=1
m is the number of missions fired in R.B.//1 (for which




is the distance in the X direction (in R.B.//1) between
the target center and the CI, for the i volley.






under the assumption that n.. and n„ are continuous, (8) can be solved
explicitly for n (or n_) to obtain:
N
n
'wtCSj ) 2 + (S| ) 2 ]
2 2
1 +




and n„ = N - n . Once this solution is obtained, appropriate integer
values of n and n may be selected.
The variances that were substituted into the system (4) above are
derived as follows. Consider only the short-range band,
where X
n
is distributed N(0,a2 ) ,1 x
x
Y is distributed N(0,a2 ) , and
1 Y
l





Then is distributed N(0,1). so that is distributed x 2 (l),
X
l \
and similarly for Y and Z .
The Chi-square random variable with k degrees of freedom has a
variance of 2k, hence Var[S 2 /c 2 ] = 2 and Var[X2 ] = 2a£ . Similarly





We can find the variance of R2 = X2 + Y2 + Z 2 as follows:
Var[R2 ] = Var[X 2 + Y 2 + Z 2 ]
= Var[X2 ] + Var[Y 2 ] + Var[Z 2 ]
(by the assumed independence of X
, Y. , and Z )
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A similar computation can be carried out to obtain the variance of R2 .
It should be noted that the above technique represents only one of
many possible ways to allocate N missions between range bands, or
between levels of other factors. Having obtained n
1
and n„, the
experimentor could require that n /24 volleys be fired for each data
cell of the short-range band, and n /24 volleys for each data cell of
the long-range band. Note that we are assuming the reduced firing matrix
with 48 data cells is used.
-68-
We now consider the problem of estimating the number of test units
that should be used for the experiment. The following discussion shows
how ATT data might also be used to obtain this estimate.
The number of test units required for the experiment should depend
(primarily) upon the variability among artillery units. The authors feel
that mean radial miss distance provides a suitable measure of a unit's
accuracy, so the distribution of mean radial miss distance for a randomly
selected unit might be used to estimate the required sample size (number
of test units) for this experiment.
Assume that ATT data is available from G units, each of which
fired a total of H missions during the ATT. Let R. . denote the
radial miss distance of the FFE volley of the i mission fired by the
j unit (i = 1, ..., H; j = 1, ... ., G). ATT data could be used to
1
H
compute u . = — ) R. . , the estimated mean radial miss distance for
2 i=l 1J
unit j . This computation should be carried out for each of the units
and the results used to obtain an empirical distribution (histogram) of
the random variable u , the mean radial miss distance of a randomly
selected unit. The Central Limit Theorem leads us to conjecture that
y is (approximately) a normally distributed random variable. A
u
goodness-of-f it test could be applied to test the assumption of nor-
mality. If the test shows that a normal distribution provides an accept-
able fit, that particular normal distribution could be used to estimate
the required number of test units.
To obtain this estimate, a procedure similar to that used for esti-
mating n could be used. For example, the expected length of a 1 - a
-69-
per cent confidence interval on y (the mean of y ) could be set equal
to some selected value. For y distributed normally with unknown
variance, /m-1 (y - y)/S is distributed as a t random variable
J yJ
with m-1 degrees of freedom, where m is the number of test units
required for the experiment. A 1 - a per cent confidence interval
on y can be obtained as follows:





- t /0 S /Jm^l < y < y _ + t /n S /v^-1 ] ,J a/2 y J a/2 y '
where t ,„ is the 100(l-a/2) percentile of the Student's t-distribution
x
V
with m-1 degrees of freedom. Note that y = — ^ y. and
\ - 3 JS -
1
)
2 can both be obtained from ATT data. As was
done previously, equating the expected length of the above confidence
interval to some appropriate constant will provide an estimate of the
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